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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1331 
___________ 
 
MOZAMMAL HOQUE, 
          Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                        Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No.:  A073-048-883) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Mirlande Tadal 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 16, 2014 
 
Before:  RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR. and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 17, 2014) 
___________ 
 
O P I NI O N 
___________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mozammal Hoque petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) decision declining to reopen his removal proceedings sua sponte.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. 
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I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the background 
of this case, we discuss that background only briefly here.  Hoque is a citizen of 
Bangladesh who entered the United States in 1993.  Removal proceedings were initiated 
against him in 1999, but those proceedings were administratively closed in 2003.  In 
2011, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) successfully moved to recalendar 
the proceedings and change venue from New York, New York, to York, Pennsylvania.  
DHS then filed an additional charge of removability — the original charge was for being 
present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled, see 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) — asserting that he had been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 Hoque conceded the original charge of removability and the Immigration Judge 
(“IJ”) sustained the added charge.  Hoque then applied for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture.  The IJ denied that application 
and the BIA dismissed his appeal.  Hoque did not petition for review of that dismissal.  
 Thereafter, in July 2013, Hoque married Zarzina Tanvir, a lawful permanent 
resident of the United States and the mother of his two United States citizen children.  
The following month, Tanvir filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative on Hoque’s behalf 
with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services.  With that petition pending, 
Hoque moved the BIA to reopen his removal proceedings so that he could seek 
adjustment of status.  On January 16, 2014, the BIA denied the motion, concluding that it 
was untimely, and “declin[ing] to exercise [its] discretionary authority to reopen and 
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remand or terminate these proceedings sua sponte.”  (A.R. at 3.)  In reaching this 
conclusion, the BIA noted that Hoque did not appear to be prima facie eligible for 
adjustment of status because the IJ’s finding that Hoque had been convicted of a crime 
involving moral turpitude rendered him inadmissible to the United States.  The BIA 
continued: 
And even if [Hoque] is not so inadmissible, or is eligible for a 
waiver of such inadmissibility, becoming eligible or 
potentially eligible for relief after a final administrative order 
has been entered is common and does not, in itself, constitute 
an exceptional circumstance warranting consideration of an 
untimely motion to reopen.  While we acknowledge that 
[Hoque’s] removal to Bangladesh may result in hardship to 
his lawful permanent resident spouse and two United States 
citizen children, we do not find exceptional circumstances in 
this case that would warrant sua sponte reopening of these 
proceedings. 
 
(Id.)  
 Hoque now seeks review of the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening.  The 
Government argues that this denial is unreviewable and that the petition for review 
should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
II. 
 Because a motion for sua sponte reopening is “committed to the unfettered 
discretion of the BIA,” Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir. 2011), we 
generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of such a motion, id. at 160.  That 
said, “we may exercise jurisdiction to the limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has 
relied on an incorrect legal premise.”  Id.  We also have jurisdiction to review 
constitutional claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). 
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 Here, Hoque argues that the BIA “made a fundamental misapprehension of law” 
when it concluded that he did not appear to be prima facie eligible for adjustment of 
status.  (Pet’r’s Br. 12.)  He also claims that the BIA “did not fully consider the record as 
a whole.”  (Id. at 13.)  If the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening had hinged on its legal 
determination about Hoque’s eligibility for adjustment of status, we would have 
jurisdiction to review that denial.  See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160.  But that was not actually 
the case.  The BIA made it clear that, regardless of whether he was eligible for 
adjustment of status, there were no exceptional circumstances warranting sua sponte 
reopening of his case.  In reaching this conclusion, the BIA did not rely on a legal 
premise or articulate some meaningful standard; rather, we read its opinion as simply 
exercising its unfettered discretion.  We lack jurisdiction over that exercise of discretion.  
See id. at 159.  Although we retain jurisdiction over Hoque’s argument that the BIA 
failed to consider the entire record — at least to the extent that this argument presents a 
due process challenge — there is no indication that the BIA actually failed to consider the 
entire record in making its decision.  Hoque focuses on the BIA’s use of the phrase 
“[a]nd even if,” but we are at a loss as to how that demonstrates that the BIA failed to 
consider the entire record. 
 In light of the above, we will dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part. 
